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INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1998, Swissair Flight 111 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean
off the coast of Nova Scotia.' As numerous newspapers, magazines, and
television reports publicized, many famous and important people were aboard
the flight. a Second only to the Clinton controversy, this plane crash dominated
media attention worldwide and caused close scrutiny of the airline industry
during the fall of 1998. While the media predominately covered issues such
as who was killed and why the crash occurred, the International Air Transpor-
tation Association (IATA) focused on a somewhat different issue. Specifi-
cally, the IATA was anxious to see what effect the Swissair disaster would
have on the international airline liability scheme because the Swissair crash
was the first international air disaster to occur since the IATA implemented a
major overhaul of the liability scheme in 1995.'
What does this mean to the families of those who had loved ones aboard
Flight 111? Unfortunately, the answer is not clear and may actually depend
on the individual nation in which each specific passenger was domiciled when
the accident occurred. If Swissair's liability for each death is uncertain, then
the resulting non-uniformity would certainly be unfair. For example, the
family of a passenger whose domicile was the United States could receive over
one hundred times the compensation received by the family of the passenger
whose domicile was India.
Since 1929, the international air community has been seeking to avoid this
very result.4 Nearly seventy years ago, delegates from around the world met
* J.D. 1999, University of Georgia.
See Dave Lenkus, Swissair Crash Unlikely to Turn Aviation Market, BUS. INS., Sept. 14,
1998, at 1.
2 See id.
See Tu Thanh Ha, The Swissair Disaster, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 9, 1998, at
A4. 4 See Katherine A. Staton, The Warsaw Convention's Facelift: Will it Meet the Needs of
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in Warsaw, Poland at what is now commonly referred to as the Warsaw
Convention.' Their goal was simple: to develop a plan of international air
liability that would later be adopted by every nation participating in interna-
tional air travel.6 Each human life would be worth a set amount that could be
recovered upon a wrongful death action brought against the airline.7 The
liability of the aircraft carrier would be predetermined, regardless of the
country in which the passenger resided.8 Thus, the family of the passenger
from India and the family of the passenger from the United States would be
compensated equally. This agreement remained in full force until 1997, with
the amount allowed for each victim of an international air disaster set at
$75,000. 9
Many individuals, especially citizens of more economically sound nations,
began to complain about the Warsaw limits on grounds that the system was
entirely unjust. For example, if one's child was killed on a flight from Atlanta
to Chicago, the recovery could potentially be over $1 million.'0 Yet, another
family's recovery for the death of their child on a flight from Atlanta to
London would be limited to $75,000.1 In an effort to address these com-
plaints, the IATA proposed several changes to the Warsaw System.' 2 More
significantly, the IATA proposed returning to the "old system" of liability,
where each victim's wrongful death recovery would be contractually based on
the laws of his or her domiciled nation. '3 This result would require two
essential acts: (1) the consent of the individual airline carriers within a nation
to ignore the $75,000 liability ceiling and (2) the development by each airline
of a recovery system for those killed in international airline disasters. 4
Although the IATA put forth an admirable effort, the adopted changes are
probably too difficult to implement in a short period of time.
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See James N. Fincher, Comment, Watching Liability Limits Under the Warsaw
Convention Fly Away, and the IA TA Initiative, 10 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 309, 310 (1997).
a See id.
9 See id.
0 See, e.g., Eric S. Roth, Note, Confronting Solicitation of Mass Disaster Victims, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 976, 976 n.46 (suggesting that victims of a Northwest Airlines crash in
Denver in 1987 were expecting SI million in recovery).
See Fincher, supra note 7, at 310.
12 See id.
' See Lee S. Kreindler, Warsaw Convention Waivers: Goodbyeto LiabilityLimitations,




This paper will examine the background of the IATA Amendments, discuss
and summarize the content of amendments concerning wrongful death
limitations, and then examine the IATA's success or failure in various nations
across the world. A particular focus will be given to the fundamental political
structures of the nations and how these structures have affected their respective
approaches to implementation. The paper will also consider whether the post-
IATA Warsaw Agreement is destined to be unsuccessful. Finally, the paper
will suggest an alternative way for coping with the international air disaster
liability dilemma.
I. THE IATA AMENDMENTS AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE WARSAW AGREE-
MENT
A. Background. The History Behind the 1995 Amendments
In the late 1920s, the airline industry began to flourish. Commercial
airlines had expanded so that flights were available to and from cities across
the world. Where Orville and Wilbur Wright were barely able to cross the
town of Kitty Hawk, North Carolina, airplanes were now crossing the Atlantic
Ocean and transporting passengers across continents. The development of the
airline industry signaled progress for the international community. However,
specific industry-related issues developed alongside the rise of the interna-
tional passenger flight.
The issue of tort liability raised the greatest number of concerns. In the
event of an air disaster, which passengers would be able to recover and under
whose rules? Although no one desired such dire situations, most individuals
associated with the airline industry realized potential problems were on the
horizon if such a disaster were to happen. Dr. Francis Lyall of the University
of Aberdeen, Scotland, United Kingdom, noted four such problems: (1)
businessmen who traveled to multiple destinations were uncertain which
nations' laws applied to them if such a disaster occurred; (2) any such air
disaster that might happen could entirely obliterate the finances of the airline
because the industry was still relatively new and did not have-the vast financial
resources that it has today; (3) any air disaster would create the likelihood of
forum shopping because different nations would have different systems of
recovery; and (4) great problems of proof would exist in determining whether
to hold the airline at fault for the accident. 5
'" See Francis Lyall, The Warsaw Convention -Cutting the Gordian Knot and the 1995
Intercarrier Agreement, 22 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 67, 68-69 (1996).
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As a result of these concerns, representatives from twenty-three nations
attended a conference in Warsaw, Poland in October of 1929.16 Although the
United States was not a participating nation, the remaining members of the
industrial international community were able to reach an agreement that stood
for almost sixty years. 7 Commonly referred to as the Warsaw Convention, the
1929 agreement addressed many of the potential problems listed above in
addition to many problems yet uncontemplated. 8
The critical provision of the Warsaw Convention can be found in article 22
of the agreement, which established a standardized recovery amount for
personal injuries incurred on international flights. 9 Although article 20
allowed an airline to escape this liability if it could establish that it took all
"necessary measures" to avoid the disaster, article 22 of the original conven-
tion took great strides in addressing many of the pre-convention concerns.
20
In one short paragraph, article 22 removed the inequitable possibilities of
having different legal systems apply varying legal standards, hence removing
the possibility of forum shopping and the concerns of businessmen (because
recoveries would be identical in all nations). Further, article 22 helped to
soothe those air carriers who feared massive, unlimited tort litigation upon the
occurrence of an air disaster, and instead allowed these carriers to budget for
such disasters so that any one incident would not create automatic insolvency.
Thus, each of the problems discussed by Dr. Lyall was addressed by the
convention except one: the problem of proof. As mentioned above, article 20
allowed the airline to escape liability for the disaster if it could demonstrate
that all "necessary measures" were taken to prevent the disaster.2' Admittedly,
the article 20 provision hampered chances of recovery - the airline would
always have superior access to information pertaining to a crash of one of its
fleet. Perhaps to offset this tip of the scales towards the airline industry, the
convention included one important exception to the article 22 limitation
amount, which is found in article 25: If the carrier is guilty of "willful
16 See Andrea L. Buff, Note, Reforming the Liability Provisions of the Warsaw
Convention: Does the IATA Itercarrier Agreement Eliminate the Need to Amend the
Convention?, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1768, 1773 (1997).
" See Harold Caplan, The Future ofthe Warsaw Convention: A Personal Tribute to the
United States, 7-SPG AIR & SPACE LAW. 13, 13-14 (1993).
'8 See Staton, supra note 4, at 1084-85.
19 In 1929, this amount translated into approximately $8,300 United States dollars. See
Staton, supra note 4, at 1085.
20 See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. II [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
21 See id. art. 20.
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misconduct," then the liability limitations are removed entirely.22 This
provision has since developed special applications within the United States
that will be discussed in later portions of this article.
The United States jumped on the Warsaw bandwagon within five years
(1934) and the convention's provisions are currently codified at 49 U.S.C.
40105 (1994).23 Unfortunately, beginning in the mid- 1950s, certain problems
began to arise with the convention that ultimately led to a conference at the
Hague in 1955. The focus of this conference was the article 22 limitation:
many countries argued that its ceiling of 125,000 French gold Francs (SDR)
was too little compensation for injuries in the mid-twentieth century. 4
Consequently, in what is known as the Hague Protocol, the article 22
limitation on recovery was doubled to 250,000 SDRs.25 While on its surface
the protocol solved the immediate problem, the Hague protocol created an
even larger, more fundamental problem: the option of adopting the protocol
was left to each individual nation.26 Due to its lack of binding authority, many
of the problems that existed prior to the original Warsaw Convention once
again surfaced. The flights governed by the laws of countries that adopted the
protocol were forced to pay a greater recovery than those who did not adopt
it.27 Thus, both uncertainty and forum shopping once again became legitimate
concerns for the international airline community.
For reasons beyond the scope of this note, the United States was one of the
countries who Opted out of the 1955 Hague Protocol.2 ' Because American
limitations on liability remained at the 1929 original levels, great discontent-
ment began to arise towards the Warsaw agreement, culminating on November
22 See id. art. 25.
21 See Caplan, supra note 17, at 16.
24 SeeNaneen K. Baden, Comment, The Japanese Initiative on the Warsaw Convention,
61 J. AIRL. &CoM. 437, 441-42 (1995/1996).
25 See Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating
to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955,478 U.N.T.S. 373 [hereinafter Hague Protocol].
Note that the Hague Protocol also reduced the article 25 standard from "willful misconduct" to
one of "recklessness." See id.
26 See id.
27 See Trevor Atherton, Unlimited Liability for Air Passengers: The Position of Travel
Agents and Tour Operators Under the IA TA Passenger Liability Agreement Scheme, 63 J. AIR
L. & COM. 405, 410 (1997).
21 Many authors on the subject suggest that the United States generally felt that the
Hague Protocol did not go far enough in raising the article 22 limitations. See Lyall, supra note
15, at 72; Staton, supra note 4, at 1085. However, I would suggest that the protocol's rejection
reflected the United States' more general dissatisfaction with the entire Warsaw Doctrine,
including the lack of strict liability and the return of uncertainty and forum shopping. The
United States may have very well believed that the Warsaw Agreement was beyond repair.
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15, 1965, when the United States revoked the Warsaw Convention altogether.2
Naturally, the United States revocation created a crisis: the United States was
a major player in the international air field, and if its air carriers and air
passengers were not bound by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, then
a significant number of international air passengers would be removed from
the convention's reach. The IATA asked representatives from the United
States to attend an emergency conference in Montreal with hopes that the
United States would reaffirm the Warsaw document.3° Within days, the IATA
met its goal with the formation of the Montreal Agreement. This agreement,
however, contained some drastic alterations from the original 1929
document."
Most notable among the changes was an increase in the article 22 limitation
amount to $75,000.32 This was in direct response to United States criticism
that the Hague Protocol did not go far enough.33 Ironically, this change was
not the most significant to arise from the Montreal Agreement. The United
States and the IATA also agreed to waive article 20 entirely, so that the article
22 recovery was allowed and the airlines were subject to strict liability.3a For
the first time, problems of proof that exist with airline disasters were addressed
by the IATA. Finally, the Montreal Agreement enacted two other changes: a
written warning to passengers and an option of unlimited damages if there is
willful misconduct on the part of the airline.35
The Montreal Agreement made some important and necessary modifica-
tions to the Warsaw Agreement. Further, the Montreal Agreement probably
saved the Warsaw Agreement itself.3 6 After all, if the United States had
removed itself, many nations probably would have followed. The critical
problem with the Montreal Agreement, however, was that it only applied to
United States passengers, carriers, and flights.3 7 After the Montreal Agree-
ment, and until the 1995 IATA conference, one could legitimately argue that,
29 See Lyall, supra note 15, at 71, 73.
30 See id.
3' See id.
32 See Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of Warsaw and Hague Protocol, May
13, 1966, Agreement C.A.B. 18990 (approved by order E-23680), reprinted in LAWRENCE B.
GOLDHIRSCH, THE WARSAW CONVENTION ANNOTATED 317 (1988) [hereinafter Montreal
Agreement].
13 See Lyall, supra note 15, at 73.
34 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 32, at 317.
" See id. at 317-18. Recall that the United States did not adopt the Hague Protocol,
which lowered the willful misconduct standard to one of recklessness.




by focusing on Dr. Lyall's pre-Warsaw problems, the international air
community was no better off than it was in 1929.
For instance, the businessman's uncertainty was probably worse than it was
in 1929. If one were killed and associated with the United States, one could
automatically recover $75,000 through strict liability or an unlimited amount
upon a showing of willful misconduct.3 In contrast, one injured in a Hague
Protocol nation would have recovery capped at 250,000 SDRs (approximately
$16,000) 3 9 unless one demonstrated recklessness on the part of the airline,
which then allowed for unlimited recovery.40 If one were injured and
associated with a non-protocol country, the original 1929 article 22 limitations
still remained, unless one could demonstrate willful misconduct.4" Finally, in
both the Hague Protocol and original Warsaw Convention nations, the airline
could still escape from liability under article 20.42
B. An Outline of the IA TA Amendments: Changes on the Recovery Limitations
Imposed by the Warsaw Agreement
Members of the international airline community, now united as an
organization under the IATA, met in Kuala Lumpur in 1995 to address the
problems facing the industry under the current provisions of the Warsaw
Convention.43 The main goal of the IATA conference (hereinafter the 1995
Conference) was to address the issue of liability limitations and to develop,
under one common agreement, a system that represented the interests of all
nations (large and small) and all airlines (large and small).44 Indeed, in the
introduction to the final Intercarrier Agreement itself, the participants stated
their belief that "the [Warsaw] Convention's limits of liability, which have not
been amended since 1966, are now grossly inadequate in most countries and
that international airlines have previously acted together to increase them to
the benefit of passengers.,
45
Certainly, this was an ambitious goal on the part of the IATA. While many
larger airlines had no problems agreeing to increase the limitations on liability,
" See Fincher, supra note 7, at 310.
39 See Hague Protocol, supra note 25, art. XI, at 381.
40 See id. art. XIII, at 383.
41 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. XXII, at 3019.
42 See id. art. XX, at 3019.
41 See Staton, supra note 4, at 1104.
44 See id.
45 Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, reprinted in Lyall, supra note 15, at
79 [hereinafter IATA Agreement].
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
smaller airlines were concerned that any increase above the 300,000 SDR to
500,000 SDR range might result in prohibitively expensive insurance costs.
4 6
Nevertheless, the one definite result of the 1995 Conference was an agreement
to "take action" to remove the liability limits under article 22 of the Warsaw
Convention. 7 Indeed, "for small and medium sized carriers, remote from the
United States, it will be a gigantic leap from the existing limits to no limits. 48
What "action" is to be taken by the parties to the 1995 Conference? This
depends on the implementation agreement to which each carrier agrees. The
first, entitled The Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement
(MIA), requires the agreeing carriers to neither invoke the convention's
original article 22 limitation nor invoke any article 20 defenses for claims of
100,000 SDRs or less. 49 Additionally, at the option of the carrier, recoverable
compensatory damages will be determined with reference to the law of the
domicile or permanent residence of the passenger.50
The second implementation measure, which was adopted primarily for
United States carriers, was formed by the Air Transport Association (ATA).5
These measures, commonly referred to as the IPA agreement, instruct United
States air carriers as to the implementation of the MIA agreement with certain
additions." These additions are significantly more stringent than those of the
MIA itself and provide the underlying support for those who argue that the
revamped Warsaw-IATA system is destined for failure.
Among the additional requirements of the IPA, paragraph 4 stands out as
being the most significant. 3 The wording of this paragraph varies only
slightly from the MIA. The IPA reads:
The carrier agrees that the recoverable compensatory
damages may be determined by reference to the law of the
46 See James F. Brashear, IATA Airline Liability Conference Carriers Prepare to
Modernize the Warsaw System, 10 FALL AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 22 (1995). Note that the reason
that such a change would be cost prohibitive for the smaller airlines would be because of the
sharp increase in insurance premiums. See id.
4 See Lyall, supra note 15, at 79.
41 Caplan, supra note 17, at 4.
49 Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement, May 1996
[hereinafter MIA], reprinted in Staton, supra note 4, at 1106.
so See id. at 1106.
s See Kreindler, supra note 13.
52 See Staton, supra note 4, at 1108.
s Provisions Implementing the IATA Intercarrier Agreement to be Included in
Conditions of Carriage and Tariffs, May 16, 1996, 1(4) [hereinafter IPA], reprinted in Staton,
supra note 4, at 1107; see also Staton, supra note 4, at 1108; Kreindler, supra note 13.
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domicile or permanent residence of the passenger, subject
to the applicable law of recoverable compensatory dam-
ages. 4
Nevertheless, the variation is critical to the recovery of compensatory damages
by injured passengers and their families. Under the MIA, the carriers have the
option of looking to the law of the injured passenger's domicile or permanent
residence in determining compensatory damages." This option at minimum
opens the door to forum-shopping by defendant airlines. Though some airlines
(probably the larger ones with larger insurance carriers) would be likely to
follow this "option" and invoke the passenger's domiciliary law (in order to
maintain goodwill with the public, demonstrate responsibility, and quickly
resolve the dispute), there is little doubt that some airlines, on limited budgets
and paying costly insurance premiums, would shy away from the MIA's
"option." The option makes little economic sense, as a small airline would not
choose to apply the domiciliary law of an injured passenger when such
domiciliary law would cost them more money. Though goodwill, responsibil-
ity, and quick resolution are all important, if the cost of obtaining these
benefits will put an airline out of business, each of these factors quickly
becomes irrelevant.
The IPA eliminates this problem by making the carrier agree that the
domiciliary law may be applied to accident situations regardless of its choice
of law. 6 Although some authors have suggested that this provision of the IPA
makes domiciliary law "mandatory" in the determination of compensatory
damages, this may be taking paragraph 4 a bit too far.57 One cannot overlook
the word "may" in this paragraph. While certainly the airline carriers do not
have the option under the IPA to refuse to apply domiciliary law, the presence
of the word "may" suggests that domiciliary law application is not "manda-
tory." Thus, under the IPA, if a plaintiff stands to benefit from the compensa-
tory system of his domicile, then this option is available to him notwithstand-
ing any objection by the airline. However, if the plaintiff would benefit by
applying another country's compensation laws (such as the country the
accident occurred in, the country the flight originated in, etc.), then there is
nothing in the IPA language that would prohibit the plaintiff from applying
s4 IPA, supra note 53, at 1(4).
'5 See Staton, supra note 4, at 1106.
56 See id. at 1107.
5' See id. at 1109.
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this foreign law. Regardless of the interpretation, paragraph 4 of the IPA
certainly differs from its counterpart, the MIA.
The IPA has two other significant additions to the MIA: notice require-
ments and tariff payments.5" Under section II of the IPA, the airline is required
to give notice of the liability limitations before the flight begins.5 9 Again, this
demonstrates the plaintiff-friendly nature of the IPA.6 ° In addition, the IPA
agreement states that any and all participation in the 1966 Montreal Agreement
is revoked.6' This provision most likely exists to establish the permanency of
the IPA (recall that the Montreal Agreement was a temporary, last-minute
measure).62 The IPA airlines provide plaintiff passengers with some'stability
that might not have existed without the addition of this clause.63
In summary, the IATA Agreement of 1995 was critical to saving the
Warsaw Convention Agreement of 1929. Under the IATA Agreement, all
participating airlines agreed to "take action" to save the dying Warsaw
doctrine. 64 Two separate implementation agreements surfaced to put the IATA
Agreement into action: the MIA and the IPA. The MIA waives the $75,000
cap on damages, provides strict liability for damages up to $100,000, and
introduces the idea of applying domiciliary law in determining compensatory
damages. 65 The IPA takes the MIA further, by requiring tariff payments,
mandatory notice provisions, and a domiciliary law option for plaintiffs.
6
While the MIA is signed by airlines from across the world, only United States
airlines have agreed to the IPA.
SO See id. at I107.
'9 See IPA, supra note 53, at I1.
60 Note that the fact that the IPA is more plaintiff-friendly is probably a reflection on the
airlines that signed the IPA in addition to the MIA agreement. The IPA airlines are all American
airlines with significantly larger budgets and with smaller insurance premiums. This is in
contrast to the MIA airlines, who have varying economic conditions and different insurance
situations. As stated earlier, it is much easier for an airline to be plaintiff-friendly when such
actions are not cost prohibitive!
61 See IPA, supra note 53, at II.
62 See id. at I11.
63 Note, however, that this type of provision would not have been necessary for the MIA
airlines because the Montreal Agreements involved solely the United States airlines, all of which
are a part of the IPA. Further, the MIA airlines were a part of the Hague Protocol, which was
not deemed to be a temporary measure when it was created.
6 See IATA Agreement, supra note 45, at 1.
65 See MIA, supra note 49, at 1106.
6 See IPA, supra note 53, at 1106-07.
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II. THE IATA AGREEMENT'S RECEPTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE
A. The United States
Without question, the United States has been the most critical nation of the
Warsaw Convention Agreement throughout the years. Indeed, recall that the
United States was the only major nation to reject the Hague Protocol and
nearly threatened to reject the entire Warsaw Agreement ten years later.67 If
not for the special Montreal Agreement of 1966, the Warsaw Convention
would most likely have become obsolete. With this history in mind, it is not
surprising that the United States is presenting major obstacles to the 1995
"take action" order from the IATA.
1. A Problem of Partial Satisfaction
As mentioned above, all United States air carriers have signed on to both
the IPA and the MIA Agreements. 68 This fact by itself demonstrates the
problem of implementation in the United States. The IPA does not facially
contradict any part of the MIA Agreement; if it did, carriers would find it
impossible to agree to both. The IPA, however, does take the MIA much
further: where the MIA provides an option, the IPA does not; where the MIA
requires no notice, the IPA does not make notice mandatory.69 The logical
inference from the fact that United States carriers have signed on to both
agreements (as compared to most other international carriers, who have only
signed ontQ the MIA) is that the United States clearly does not feel that the
MIA goes far enough. Because the United States does not believe that the
MIA provides sufficient protection for injured passengers and their families,
it still is going to remain partially unsatisfied with the Warsaw Agreement
itself, even with the 1995 IATA "take action" order.70
Mr. Allan I. Mendelsohn, a specialist in international air liability issues,
gave a speech in Montreal, Canada in late 1996, where he agreed with this
proposition, though in a somewhat concealed fashion.7' Mr. Mendelsohn
67 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
68 See Kreindler, supra note 13.
69 See supra text accompanying note 66.
70 See Allan I. Mendelsohn, The Warsaw Convention and Where We Are Today, 62 J.
AIR L. & COM. 1071, 1077 (1997).
"' See id. at 107 1. Mr. Mendelsohn is a Washington, D.C. attorney who is active in the
international air liability field, having attended the Montreal Convention in 1966. See id. at
1071 n.a.
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outlined four elements that the United States targeted in improving the
Warsaw Convention Agreement prior to the 1995 "take action" order:
unlimited liability, absolute liability, lex loci domicilii, and the implementation
of a fifth forum. 7 2 According to Mendelsohn, the United States is satisfied that
all but the last of these elements have been met by the IATA/MIA/IPA
agreements.73
Certainly, the IATA/MIA/IPA have attempted to resolve the first element
of the United States' concern about the limited liability that the Warsaw
Convention adopted.74 Both the MIA and the IPA carriers have agreed to drop
the article 22 liability limitations so that the $75,000 maximum recovery
amount is now obsolete.75 In his speech, Mendelsohn recognizes that this is
"something that the United States has been seeking for a very long time., 76
Although there are still airlines that have failed to sign onto either the MIA or
the IPA, these airlines are limited in number and other provisions of the
MIA/IPA (see below) attempt to address these concerns.
Mendelsohn's second element, absolute liability, also seems to be
addressed by both the MIA and IPA Agreements. Although both agreements
limit this absolute liability to $150,000 and the United States could have tried
to set this amount higher, the United States seems to be satisfied with the
$150,000 ceiling on absolute liability.77 Why is this? Apparently, one of three
scenarios must be true: (1) the United States is satisfied that the $150,000
ceiling is sufficiently high to fully reward injured plaintiffs; (2) the absolute
liability element really was not as essential to the United States as Mendelsohn
would suggest; or (3) other avenues exist to avoid the $150,000 limit imposed
by the IPA and the MIA.
The first of these scenarios must be quickly rejected. While $150,000 is
double the amount of the previous ceiling established under the Warsaw
Convention as amended by the Montreal Agreement, one must remember that
the Montreal Agreement was established over thirty years ago.78 Indeed,
Harold Caplan notes that the recovery amount would need to be six times
greater in order to remain consistent with the 100,000 SDR amount established
72 See id.
'3 See id.




71 See Montreal Agreement, supra note 32, at 317.
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in 1971.9 In other words, the $150,000 ceiling on absolute liability is too low
an amount to truly establish an absolute liability system for recovery in
international air disasters. While admittedly any absolute liability is a step in
the right direction in the eyes of the United States, it would be quite unlikely
that a system with this low of a ceiling would greatly alter the workings of the
Warsaw System.
The second scenario seems much more likely on its face. Perhaps
Mendelsohn is simply wrong and the establishment of an absolute liability
system was not that important to the United States after all. One must admit
that the main objection of the United States throughout the history of the
Warsaw Convention has been the recovery ceiling imposed by article 22.8"
One could legitimately suggest that this and only this was the main priority of
the United States in forming the IPA Agreement for implementation of the
IATA Amendments. While absolute liability certainly was a positive result of
the IPA and MIA, it was not the critical issue that Mendelsohn suggested.
This argument is furthered by examining the lack of differences on this subject
between the IPA and the MIA. If absolute liability were really that important
to the United States, why not increase the $150,000 ceiling on absolute
liability or eliminate it altogether? This would appear to be a very simple
undertaking, especially considering that United States air carriers have already
developed a separate implementation agreement in the IPA. In light of the
passenger-friendly nature of the IPA and the United States approach, why not
take the IPA farther than the MIA in yet another area?
Certainly this could have been done. The $150,000 ceiling could have been
left out of the IPA and there would have been little doubt that absolute liability
was a priority for the United States. We should not be so quick to dismiss
Mendelsohn's second element. There is a much more likely explanation as to
why the United States willingly conceded to the $150,000 absolute liability
system originally established in the MIA agreement. Recently, at least one
authority has argued that the $150,000 absolute liability cap is really no cap
at all.8' He reaches this conclusion by examining the workings of the
MIA/IPA agreements and how they correspond to the original Warsaw
Document.
'9 See Caplan, supra note 17, at 19. Note that most of the Montreal Agreement was
adopted by other nations in the Guatemala City Protocol of 1971 (which raised the recovery cap
to 100,000 SDRs).
" See generally Caplan, supra note 17, at 14 (quoting Secretary of State Cordell Hull
in 1934 arguing for the limits as beneficial to passengers and carriers).
"l See Kreindler, supra note 13.
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The $150,000 absolute liability cap is tied into article 20 of the Warsaw
Convention.82 While the original Warsaw Convention allowed an airline to
escape liability if they took "all necessary measures" in avoiding an accident,83
the MIA/IPA implementations remove this escape hatch up to approximately
$145,000.84 Kreindler's argument is as follows:
The only situation that we know of where an airline can
possibly show that "it took all necessary measures to
prevent the damage" is the missile possibility that has
surfaced in the TWA 800 accident - that a missile was
fired by a non-airline source. In only one case has the
airline sustained an Article 20(1) defense ... If one puts
aside the missile possibility ... the carrier is liable, and
the fact that Article 20(1) is in there above [$150,000] has
no practical significance. That is certainly absolute
liability in real terms. And so, for the first time, on a
major scale in a major place, we will truly be living with
a no-fault absolute liability system.85
Although Kreindler later continues to argue that this is an unfavorable result
for the entire airline industry (including aviation attorneys and insurance
carriers), he does not attempt to suggest that this result would be disfavored by
the United States government or by the injured passengers themselves.86
Indeed, if we are to believe Mendelsohn, the United States very much favors
this result.87 Consequently, the United States is satisfied by the IPA/MIA
Agreements.88
Mendelsohn's third element, lex loci domicilii, is also addressed in both the
IPA and the MIA, but in contrast to the first two elements, it is addressed
somewhat differently by each agreement.89 The MIA allows the airline the
82 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. XX, at 3019.
83 See id.
8 See Fincher, supra note 7, at 323.
8 Kreindler, supra note 13.
86 See id. Note that Kreindler suggests later in his article that the airline industry would
prefer to maintain the $150,000 ceiling on absolute liability, but add a "simple negligence"
standard in place of the "all necessary measures" standard. See id. This two-tiered system will
be discussed later in this article.
87 See generally Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 75 (noting that the United States accepted
the IATA position calling for a $150,000 limit on the second tier under absolute liability).




option of choosing whether or not to apply the law of the passenger's domicile
in adjudicating the issue of compensatory damages.90 In contrast, the IPA
removes this option from the aircraft carriers and gives them no choice as to
the application of domiciliary law.9' Thus, only the IPA contains the concept
of lex loci domicilii in its "pure form. '92 Conversely, the MIA has lex loci
domicilii in its "optional" form, which raises the question whether it really is
a lex ("law") under the MIA at all. 93
If this is true, and if lex loci domicilii is the essential element to the United
States that Mendelsohn suggests that it is, then he may have been too quick to
presume that the United States is satisfied this element has been met.94 Indeed,
the American airlines have all agreed via the IPA to abide by a rule of lex loci
domicilii.95 American officials must see this as a step in the right direction.
However, if the United States was dissatisfied with the Warsaw Convention,
as amended by the Montreal Agreement of 1966 because of concern for United
States passengers seeking access to United States courts, then the United States
must remain dissatisfied with the Warsaw Doctrine to this day, even after
IPA/MIA implementation.96 Under today's regime, if an American passenger
is injured on an American international flight, then his family can recover
compensatory damages under the laws of the United States, regardless of
where the crash occurs. 97 However, if that same American passenger is on an
airline governed solely by the MIA, then his family cannot be certain that
United States law would apply. 98 As long as lex loci domicilii is a critical
element for the United States, this result cannot be acceptable.
Mendelsohn finally argues that the fourth United States element, which he
refers to as the "fifth forum," is "the single and only remaining element that
90 See MIA, supra note 49, at 11(1).
9' See Staton, supra note 4, at 1109. Under the IPA, compensatory damages will only
be determined by the law of the passenger's domicile. See id.
9' See id.
93 See id. at 1108-09.
9' Mendelsohn is most likely correct in asserting that lex loci domicilii is an essential
element for United States satisfaction. This point is furthered by its presence in the IPA
(implementation measures for United States airlines) and the DOT requirements. See Brashear,
supra note 46, at 21.
9' See Staton, supra note 4, at 1106.
96 See Robert P. Warren, The Future and Effect ofthe L4 TA IntercarrierAgreenients on
Passenger Liability: A U.S. Perspective, 11 -SUM AIR & SPACE LAW. 3, 4 (1996) (arguing that
the United States wants to assure its citizens access to its courts).
97 See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1080.
98 See Staton, supra note 4, at 1106 and text accompanying note 55.
1999]
GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
separates the United States from the rest of the world."99 This assertion by
Mendelsohn may be partially incorrect in that this is not the only element that
separates the United States from the rest of the world, as long as we acknowl-
edge lex loci domicilii as an essential United States element. Mendelsohn is,
however, right on target when he identifies the "fifth forum" issue as a sticking
point between the United States and the rest of the world.
To begin, one must understand exactly what the United States is asking
when it says that it is seeking a "fifth forum." A fifth forum is exactly that: a
potential fifth forum in which an injured airline passenger may bring suit.'l°
Note the four forums that currently exist: the air carrier's principle place of
business, the place of business where the passenger made a contract with the
air carrier, the location of the passenger's destination, and the air carrier's
domicile.' 0 ' A fifth forum is added allowing an injured passenger to bring suit
in the country where he or she is domiciled. It is important to note the
difference between lex loci domicilii and the fifth forum. Lex loci domicilii
seeks to apply the law of the country where the injured passenger is domiciled,
while the fifth forum seeks to force the courts of the injured's domicile to hear
the case.'o2 This distinction is critical in understanding the debate currently in
progress between the United States and the rest of the world.
Mendelsohn describes the American argument for a fifth forum as an
attempt to protect passengers worldwide, notjust Americans (contrary to what
the IATA has suggested).'0 3 Indeed:
There are wandering Germans, wandering Swiss, wander-
ing British, and wanderers of every nationality. There are
no greater number of Americans who live in Hong Kong
and fly Hong Kong-Moscow-Hong Kong than there are
Germans or Frenchmen or British. These same foreigners
probably also fly Hong Kong-United States as often as
Americans. If they fly on a third country airline, are we
going to say that none of these foreigners will be able to
sue in their home countries? Are the governments of
Germany and France really going to say that they do not
want their citizens to be able to sue at home? Are they
See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1075.
'0o See Buff, supra note 16, at 1833.
o See id. at 1802.
102 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 911 (6th ed. 1990).
03 See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1078.
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going to say that their citizens should be able to sue only
in one of the often very fortuitous and faraway Article 28
forums? I believe they will not and it would be a great
mistake if they did. 'O
Unfortunately, as Mendelsohn suggests, not all countries feel that this "fifth
forum" is a great idea.'0 5
The main complaint of the IATA is that the concept of a fifth forum
violates the Warsaw Convention Agreement itself.'0 6 This argument is based
in article 32 of the original agreement, which reads:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special
agreements entered into before the damage occurred by
which the parties purport to infringe the rules laid down by
this convention, whether by deciding the law to be applied,
or by altering the rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and
void.
10 7
At least one author suggests that "it appears that a carrier or its insurers could
avoid this clause in the [implementation agreements] even if it was agreed to
and includedin their conditions of carriage."' 8 The American response to this
criticism is that the fifth forum argument does not "infringe the rules" laid
down by the original Warsaw Convention. The opposition has yet to accept
this argument.0 9
The other argument against the adoption of a fifth forum in international air
disasters is a financial one. Many smaller airlines are concerned that the fifth
forum possibility would increase recovery amounts for injured passengers
since more suits could be brought in the United States."0 The increase in
recoveries would consequently increase the already costly insurance premiums
that the individual airline is forced to pay."' Although Mendelsohn attempts
to argue that this is not a problem because the American courts would invoke
10 Id.
'os See id. at 1077.
'06 See id. at 1075.
107 Warsaw Convention, supra note 20, art. 32, at 3021.
108 Atherton, supra note 27, at 416.
'09 See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1076.
"0 See Bruno Bertucci, A European Perspective on Air Carrier Liability, 9-SUM AIR &
SPACE LAW. 1, 17 (1994).
11 See id.
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forum non conveniens as a result of the lex loci domicilii application, this
argument seems questionable at best. 1
12
Forum non conveniens is used sparingly in the American courts and is
nothing more than a judicially-created doctrine. The United States Supreme
Court itself has said recently that theforum non conveniens doctrine "make[s]
uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible" due to the
discretionary nature of the doctrine. 3 Although it might be accurate to predict
insurance-premiums will fall if United States courts invoke the forum non
conveniens doctrine whenever possible (thereby actually forcing more suits to
be heard outside of the United States), insurance companies cannot rely on an
automatic assumption that the forum non conveniens doctrine will apply." 4
Instead, premiums would most likely rise sharply at the first invocation of the
fifth forum, though the effect on airline ticket prices should be negligible." 5
Nevertheless, this premium rise would instantly force many of these smaller
airlines out of business. "6 Consequently, the United States has a long way to
go before it will convince the IATA that a fifth forum provision should be
allowed as an amendment to the original Warsaw Agreement.
2. The United States Department of Transportation vs. The World
The United States is only partially satisfied with the IATA Amendments to
the Warsaw Convention, notwithstanding the more stringent guidelines that are
incorporated within the IPA implementation measure.' After the American
airlines unanimously signed the IPA, the United States Department of
Transportation (the DOT) conditioned its approval of the IATA Amendments
on four significant addendums." 8
First, the DOT proposed that the lex loci domicilii provision become
mandatory for all flights that enter or leave the United States. " 9 This request
is consistent with the prediction that Mendelsohn was correct in arguing that
lex loci domicilii was indeed an important objective for the United States in
112 See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1080.
13 American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,455 (1994).
114 See id.
"'5 See Matthew R. Pickelman, Comment, Draft Conventionfor the Unification of Certain.
Rules for International Carriage by Air: The Warsaw Convention Revisitedfor the Last Time?,
64 J. AIR LAW & CoM. 273, 304 (1998).
16 See Brashear, supra note 46, at 22.
117 See supra text accompanying note 70.
js See Buff, supra note 16, at 1820.
"1 See id. at 1822.
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reforming the Warsaw document. 20 The DOT's request also supports the
conclusion that the current IPA/MIA implementation measures fall short of
meeting this important goal.' 2' Indeed, as the DOT proposal indicates, the
MIA implementation measures have no binding effect on airlines choosing not
to sign on to that specific agreement. 22 Thus, any American passenger flying
on an airline other than an MIA airline is not able to take advantage of the lex
loci domicilii application. 23 The DOT's request seeks to remedy this
problem.
24
The other extremely controversial addendum the DOT sought to add was
a requirement that all air carriers submit to the court of the passenger's
domicile: the dreaded fifth forum issue.'25 This is a bold attempt by the DOT
to persuade the international community to adopt a venue-choosing system that
only the United States fully supports.'26 One might tangentially note at this
point that the DOT qualified its lex loci domicilii request by stating that it only
wanted to require lex loci domicilii to apply to flights entering and leaving the
United States, while on the fifth forum addendum, the DOT allowed for no
such limitation.' 27 Perhaps this confirms the suggestion that lex loci domicilii
was less important to the United States than Mendelsohn and others
believed. 28 Regardless, the DOT surely knew that the IATA would object to
this addendum.
Two additional addendums were sought by the DOT.129 First, the DOT
requested that all airlines entering or leaving the United States either be party
to the IATA Amendments or else assume liability for the entire flight in the
case of a disaster. 30 Second, the DOT "proposed establishing a requirement
that air carriers make previously existing liability provisions, which were more
120 See supra text accompanying note 96.
121 See supra text accompanying note 98.
122 See Buff, supra note 16, at 1821.
23 See generally id. (discussing DOT requests with respect to lex loci domicilii).
124 See id.
125 Seeid. at 1820-21.
126 See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1076.
127 See DOT Order No. 96-10-7 (Oct. 7, 1996), available in 1996 WL 563872 [hereinafter
"show cause order"].
128 See supra text accompanying notes 90-99.
129 See Buff, supra note 16, at 1822.
1 0 See id. Interestingly enough, the United States only requested that the airlines entering
the country be party to the IATA General Agreement and not the IPA implementation measures.
See id. One possible explanation for this is that the United States was satisfied that MIA airlines
would sufficiently protect United States passengers as long as the first addendum was also added
to the IATA Agreement.
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generous than those required by the IATA Intercarrier Agreements, available
to passengers traveling to or from the United States."' 3
According to at least one author, this "IATA derailment by the United
States was a significant concern industry-wide."' 32 Why were the DOT's
addendums considered a "derailment" of the IATA proposals? The DOT's
opposition repeated many of the arguments presented above, objecting to lex
loci domicilii and the fifth forum provisions; they claimed that article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention prevented any creation of a "fifth forum" by the DOT,
IATA, or any other organization and that the lex loci domicilii requirement
could be cost prohibitive to regional airlines. 3 In addition, the IATA argued
that it had no power under the Warsaw Convention agreement to force all
airlines entering or leaving the United States to be party to the IATA
amendments or assume all liability.'34 Specifically, the IATA argued that
article 30 prevented such a request and only after an amendment to the
Warsaw Agreement itself could such a request be legal. 35 Ironically, even the
IPA signatories complained about the suggested DOT addendums because they
believed that "approval of its implementation agreement without conditions
would permit signatory air carriers to offer immediate benefits to
passengers.' 36 Clearly, the battle lines had been drawn.
The DOT suddenly found itself looking like the bad guy of the international
.air community, a position it somewhat tried to remedy when it agreed to delay
discussion on all of its requested addendums with the exception of one: lex loci
domicilii for all aircraft entering or leaving the United States. '7 The DOT was
speaking loud and clear as it considered lex loci domicilii an important issue.
The issue was so important that the DOT was willing to temporarily forget
about its other objections and ratify the IATA/IPA Amendments if the lex loci
domicilii addendum was agreed to by the international community. 8
Much to the IATA's credit, it did not budge from its position. It reasserted
the argument that the lex loci domicilii provision would be cost prohibitive and
added that the IATA would run the risk of losing signatory airlines generally
(including MIA and non-implementation signing airlines) if the lex loci
131 Id.
'32 Staton, supra note 4, at 1 111.








domicilii provision was accepted. 9 Finally, on January 8, 1997, the DOT
conceded to delay its request for the lex loci domicilii addendum. 40 The DOT
approval, however, was only temporary, and the IATA Amendments were to
be reviewed no later than June 30, 1998.' 4 1 On August 24, 1998, the DOT
issued an order extending this deadline for review to September 30, 1999, and
noted that "much work remains to be done if voluntary adherence to the IATA
Agreements is to constitute the means of preserving the Warsaw System.' 42
The DOT has a long way to go in a short period of time if the Warsaw
Doctrine is to survive into the 21 st century.
B. The European Community
The European Community (EC)provides an entirely different set of
challenges to successful IATA implementation. 43 These different challenges
can' be greatly attributed to Europe's diversity. While the United States
consists of fifty tightly-woven states that are accustomed to dealing with the
international community as one consolidated unit, many European countries,
including those belonging to the EC, have established their own unique
systems for dealing with the inadequacies of the sixty year-old Warsaw
Agreement.'"
1. The Warsaw Agreement in Europe Before the IATA Amendments
As early as 1985, the members of the EC realized that the Warsaw
Convention (as amended by the Hague Protocol) was destined for failure if
changes were not soon implemented.' 45 Italy shocked the international air
community on May 2 of that year when it withdrew from the agreement. 146
Specifically, the Italian courts declared that liability limits for personal injury
or death as laid down by the Warsaw Convention and amended by the Hague
3 See id.
140 See id. at 1825-26.
' See Staton, supra note 4, at 1112.
141 Order Extending Discussion Authority, Order 98-8-28, Dep't Transp., Aug. 28, 1998,
at I, available in 1998 WL 527097.
'" See generally Bertucci, supra note 110, at 19 (outlining the various decision-making
groups analyzing the liability limits).
144 See id.
141 See id. at 12.
146 Id. at 12 n.2.
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Protocol were unconstitutional.147 Further, the Italian legislature decided to
oblige "all carriers whose routes have a departure or a landing within Italian
territory to cover their liability for at least 100,000 SDR... per passenger in
order to benefit from the limitations laid down by the Warsaw Convention."
48
In essence, the Italians implemented in 1985 what the IATA and the United
States could not implement until ten years later. 149
Approximately eight years after Italy's drastic action, the remaining
European countries seemed to awaken to the problems that the Warsaw
Agreement posed for them. 5° The timing of Europe's awakening was neither
the result of random decision making nor the result of great, painstaking
research. Instead, it was the Japanese Initiative of 1992 '' (to be discussed
later) that prompted the EC to seek modification of the Warsaw Agreement.5 2
The EC's modification efforts began on January 18, 1993, when all EC
heads of state, with the addition of Norway and Sweden, met in Brussels to
discuss the current problems with the Warsaw Agreement.' Two issues
quickly surfaced at the Brussels convention. First, all nations present agreed
that the current mandatory liability limits were too low. 5 4 A great diversity
existed between the amounts that an EC citizen could recover in a domestic air
accident and what the same citizen could recover in an international
accident.' 55 Much like the United States, the EC felt that the Warsaw
Agreement was disadvantaging its own citizens for the benefit of foreign air
carriers.) 6 Without question, the EC felt that it needed to put its citizens
first. '7
In addition, the EC realized the need to have a consistent, common liability
system for all European countries.'58 Indeed, the EC felt that if it did not act
147 See id.
141 Id. at 1.
149 Compare id. at 12 n.2 with the MIA, supra note 49, at 1106 (declaring that the limited
liability rules under the Warsaw Convention would not be invoked).
SO See id. at 12.
s ' See generally Baden, supra note 24, at 448-65 (providing an indepth analysis of the
initiative).









soon, many other European nations might follow the trend of Italy, Japan, and
the United States and set out on an independent course of their own. 159
Why would the independent course approach be a bad idea? Two possible
explanations exist: (1) the EC believed that allowing each European country
to establish its own rules and guidelines in such an important area would be
harmful to its political goal of unification or (2) the EC realized that the
Warsaw "ideal," the concept that the entire international community benefits
from unified, consistent, and neutral liability laws, was at risk, and the EC
feared that a patchwork, individualized approach to solving the Warsaw
Agreement's problems would ultimately result in its destruction. 160 Most
likely, both of these explanations are correct.
Certainly, the central purpose of the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, fostering
"increased cooperation and harmonization on the European level," would not
have been furthered by allowing each European country to develop its own
liability system.' 6 1 In 1993, even more so than today, both Japan and the
United States, the EC's largest economic rivals, had serious doubts as to
whether the Europeans would be able to take Europe's vast diversity and
combine it into one unified political force. 162 With such lofty political goals
and extensive international doubt, there should be little wonder why "the
European Commission emphasized the importance of regulation for all EC
members.' 63
Additionally, the Europeans, probably to a greater extent than the
Americans, realized the importance of maintaining the Warsaw "ideal."'' 64 If
the Warsaw Agreement was to be abandoned, then many European airlines
could be forced to endure multiple litigation, much of which could be in the
United States. 6' Further, based on the stated goals for IATA implementation,
there was some indication that several nations (namely Japan and the United
States) would adopt a combination of unlimited liability and strict liability,
9 See id.
160 See Bertucci, supra note 110, at 16 (discussing unification); see also Warren L. Dean,
Jr., Airline Liability in International Air Transportation: Time for a Change,4-WTR AIR &
SPACE LAW. 1, 9 (1989) (stating the wide international support for preserving the Warsaw
System).
161 Dieter Kugelmann, The Maastricht Treaty and the Design of a European Federal
State, 8 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 335, 354 (1994).
162 Seegenerally Matthew J. Eshelman, Comment, The Maastricht Train: Slowing Down
for Sharp Curves, I 1 DICK. J. INT'L L. 605, 624 (1993) (discussing the integration of the EC).
163 Bertucci, supra note 110, at 12.
16 See supra text accompanying notes 158-60.
16' See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1079.
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whether it be within or outside the Warsaw framework. 166 If such a system
were to be adopted, many feared that insurance premiums would skyrocket and
force the smaller airlines either out of the air in the countries that adopted such
systems or out of the airline business entirely.167 Once again, the EC needed
to demonstrate to the world that it would protect its industry.
At the same time that EC leaders meeting in Brussels, the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) convened to discuss an identical issue: the soon-
to-be-failure of the Warsaw Agreement.168 At the conclusion of the ECAC
conference, the task force agreed that the liability limits needed to be increased
(the suggested increase was from 100,000 SDRs to 250,000 SDRs). 169 Further,
the task force suggested a unique proposal whereby there would be a "prompt
payment of a nonrefundable sum to an injured passenger or his nearest relative
in the event of his death., 170 This proposal would soon become the distin-
guishing feature of the EC's proposal to the world.
2. The IATA Amendments? What IATA Amendments?
In 1995, after two years of negotiation, debate, and advisement, the EC
submitted its Warsaw Agreement revisions to the world.' 7 ' Among the
suggested modifications to the Warsaw Agreement was the implementation of
a partial strict liability system, as well as the partial advance payment idea
advocated several years earlier by the ECAC. 72 Meanwhile, the IATA was
also addressing the inadequacies of the Warsaw Convention and developing
its own amendments. 173 Because the IATA Amendments covered many of the
same concerns that the EC's initial proposal covered, the EC nations soon
found themselves at a crossroads: Do we help develop the ECAC proposal and
develop a unified liability system for European nations, or do we focus on
developing the IATA Amendments and attempt to incorporate the ECAC
166 See id. at 1075; Baden, supra note 24, at 455.
167 See Buff, supra note 16, at 1825. Buff admits that many people originally thought that
insurance premiums would skyrocket with a strict liability system, but now many people in the
insurance industry question whether this is true.





173 See supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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proposal in the implementation process (much as the United States DOT
did)? 74 Ultimately, the EC chose to take the former route.
As of the most recent report, the European Parliament is considering
passing a resolution that would provide for the elimination of liability limits
altogether, strict liability for damages up to 120,000 European Currency Units,
the payment of a nonrefundable advance payment within ten days of an airline
disaster in an amount sufficient to satisfy immediate economic need to. a
victim or his or her family (to be offset at final settlement), and most
interestingly, the allowance of a fifth forum, the passenger's domicile.175
Perhaps the most troublesome feature of the European proposal is that it would
apply solely to EC member state air carriers, and it could not protect
passengers on non-EC chartered flights. 17
6
The IATA was less than enthusiastic about the Europeans' competing
agreement. Claiming that the "EC proposal risked complicating and
counteracting already existing reform efforts" and citing the concern over
problems of proof that the advance payment system might create, the IATA
seems to be irritated that the EC was not patient enough to let it reform the
Warsaw Agreement. 77 Notwithstanding the IATA's objections, the EC
continues to pursue the above-described plan of action. ,78 It is important to
note, however, that most of the major European airlines have signed on to the
IATA Amendments as well, via use of the MIA implementation agreement.
79
3. Europe: Why A Different Course Is Needed
Even the most optimistic supporter of the IATA Amendments would
describe the status of the Warsaw Agreement in Europe as shaky at best. The
Europeans seem to be developing an alternative, strictly European system of
liability for international air travel. This system, if adopted, would force the
amended Warsaw Doctrine off the European continent. 180 While it is true that
the EC believes the "Warsaw ideal" is essential to the well-being of the
international air community, 8' the EC has decided that this ideal can be better
174 See Buff, supra note 16, at 1826.
"' See id. at 1829.
176 See id.
17 Id. at 1830.
,71 See id. at 1828.
"' See generally Staton, supra note 4, at 1105 (noting that by sometime in 1997, twenty-
four international carriers had signed the MIA).
'go See supra text accompanying notes 175-179.
181 See supra text accompanying note 164.
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accomplished by unifying and modernizing the international liability laws in
Europe only (in contrast to world-wide modernization).'8 2 The Europeans
believe that the "Warsaw ideal" of uniformity and consistency can best be met
by focusing on Europe alone. This is because Europeans are coping with
several issues unique to the EC.'83
The first critical issue revolves around the problem of escalating insurance
premiums."'8 As mentioned earlier, Europe is home to many smaller-market,
smaller scale airline industries.'85 These airlines naturally run on a much
smaller budget.'86 This is in sharp contrast to the United States, where most
airlines are large in fleet size and financial backing. '87 Consequently, while the
American airlines (and the United States DOT specifically) are pushing for
unlimited liability for international air disasters, this could be a destructive
blow to many of the smaller European airlines.'88 As Bruno Bertucci, head of
one of Italy's largest airline insurers notes:
Any increase in liability limits would produce an increase
in insurance costs, which would be substantial in the case
of unlimited liability. However, it is almost impossible for
an insurer to predict an increase in costs on a hypothetical
basis. The cost depends on the airline considered and its
scope of operation."'
This point is furthered by the Chairman of the Aviation Insurance Offices'
Association, who said that "it [was] impossible to quantify the exact increase
the insurance industry could face in passenger liability claims, but estimates
the increase at $300 million annually."' 190
Fortunately, the recent Swissair Flight 11 1 crash has suggested otherwise.
Even though up to sixty-four percent of the insurance underwriters' estimated
written premiums for 1998 will be consumed in compensation of Swissair
182 See supra text accompanying note 176.
... See Bertucci, supra note 1 10, at 16-18.
'84 See id. at 17.
... See G. Porter Elliot, Antitrust at 35,000 Feet: The Extraterritorial Application of
United States and European Community Law in the Air Transport Sector, 31 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 185, 230 (1998).
186 See id.
187 See id.
" See Bertucci, supra note 110, at 17.
189 Id.
... Fincher, supra note 7, at 310.
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victims' families, market executives predict that the accounts renewing during
the fall of 1998 will have little problem in reducing their premiums by up to
thirty percent. 9' Thus, if these predictions prove correct and if the insurance
premiums do not escalate in the aftermath of the first crash after the IATA
amended the Warsaw Doctrine, then experience may help to alleviate this
concern for the Europeans.
Notwithstanding this possibility, Bertucci recommends an alternate
solution: "the best choice for the EC countries would definitely be to find an
approximate level of limitation and a reasonable way to revise the limits
periodically."' 92 Unfortunately, Bertucci may also be mistaken on this point. 93
The IATA Amendments (as influenced by the United States DOT, American
air carriers, and the success of the Japanese Initiative) have as their corner-
stone unlimited liability. 94 Further, all indications from the United States
continue to suggest that the unlimited liability ideal is essential to that
country's continued participation in the Warsaw agreement.' 9' Finally, even
if the United States did not stand in the way of Europe imposing its regional
ideals on the IATA Amendments, the last two years of negotiations and
amendments show that the proposed European goal may be impossible within
the Warsaw framework.1
96
There is no possible way that the Warsaw Doctrine can adopt a system
where there is a "reasonable way to revise the [liability] limit periodically."'1
97
Indeed, the Warsaw Agreement has nearly been destroyed during each of the
last four decades because the doctrine is so inflexible. 9s The reasons for this
inflexibility can be debated: each nation's compensation system may be too
inconsistent with every other nation's interest;' 99 the doctrine's age might
'9' See Lenkus, supra note 1, at 2.
192 Bertucci, supra note I 10, at 17.
'93 The idea that Bertucci somehow reached the wrong conclusion about the adaptability
of the Warsaw Doctrine is of no surprise and is of little significance when evaluating the
European concerns which he submits. One must remember that Bertucci wrote this article in
1994, which was more than one year before the actual IATA Amendments surfaced. In addition,
it was written approximately two years before the DOT strongly supported unlimited liability.
Thus, what might have seemed possible within the confines of the Warsaw Doctrine in 1994
might not seem possible today.
114 See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1075; see also Baden, supra note 24, at 455
(explaining that cultural reasons and a serious airline crash in 1985 both contributed to the need
for unlimited liability).
'9' See Mendelsohn, supra note 70, at 1075.
196 See Buff, supra note 16, at 1830.
' Bertucci, supra note 110, at 17.
... See Atherton, supra note 27, at 408.
199 See Bertucci, supra note 110, at 18 (discussing social security systems).
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finally be rearing its head regarding damage limitations; 200 the original
doctrine's language pertaining to liability limits may have been
mistranslated.2 1' Regardless, the Warsaw Doctrine has proven nearly
impossible to alter.
When the doctrine has been altered, as in 1995, some nations were offended
and threatened to withdraw if their interests went unaddressed.2 °2 How could
the Warsaw Agreement encompass a system that asks for a limit to be
reasonably revised periodically?2 3 The answer is that it probably could not.
Thus, unless the Swissair disaster proves the EC's fears about escalating
insurance premiums to be wrong, the EC will most likely continue to look
outside the Warsaw system and develop a pact with selected countries whose
interests are identical to its own. Only under this approach can Europeans
hope to avoid costly unlimited liability (because all nations in the European
''pact" are concerned about the smaller airlines) and hope to develop a system
where the liability cap could easily be adjusted to adopt to the current
economic situation.
The second European concern that an international airline liability system
must account for is the role of the state social security systems.0 4 As Bertucci
points out, these schemes play a very important role in the settlement of
liability claims, so much that "[q]uite often social security programs are
entitled to claim reimbursement in respect of the benefits or the payments
made to victims or their next of kin up to total indemnity that should be paid
by carriers and insurers."20 5 Although the nature and procedure for reimburse-
ment varies from country to country, this uniquely European issue poses some
interesting considerations that must be accounted for in establishing a system
of liability for international air disasters.20 6 Of primary importance is the
200 See Staton, supra note 4, at 1086.
2' See Caplan, supra note 17, at 13.
202 For example, the United States threatened to withdraw from the doctrine in the 1960s.
See 'supra text accompanying note 29.
203 See supra note 193.
204 See Bertucci, supra note 1 10, at 17.
205 Id. at 18.
206 According to Bertucci, the following countries take the following approaches:
(1) France: Social security must be reimbursed up to the total
amount which the air carrier is liable for, with the exception of any
damages paid by the carrier for moral damage or physical
impairment.
(2) Germany: Social security is entitled to reimbursement for all
damages which is later paid by the airline.
(3) Italy: Social security reimbursement sums are deducted from
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discouraging effect that the state social security system will have on the
settlement of claims. If the air carrier (or the carrier's insurer) is only required
by law to pay for the amount not covered by social security, why would a
carrier ever want to pay a claimant in advance of a trial determining the social
security payment amount?2
0 7
This very problem could suggest the logic behind the non-refundable sum
component in the EC proposal. If air carriers are required to pay an amount
to the victims before any determination of social security payment has been
reached, then carriers cannot totally avoid liability simply by waiting for the
actual trial to occur. 08 Although admittedly the non-refundable sum approach
only pays the victims and their families a marginal amount, this might be seen
as a step towards avoiding the social security dilemma that most European
nations face.2"9 Moreover, because the United States has no comparable social
security system to reimburse the families of injured victims, it is not forced to
deal with the problems of carriers and insurers stalling litigation for this
reason. This analysis highlights the EC's need to have an agreement that is
separate from the Warsaw Pact. Interestingly, the non-refundable sum could
actually slow the resolution process and harm the policy goals of the United
States. 2'0 The "social security difference" may be too distinct to encompass
the EC and the rest of the world in one cohesive and workable agreement.2z '
the final settlement between the airline and the victim's family, not
exceeding the total amount of the settlement itself. Physical
impairment and moral damages are excluded.
(4) Netherlands: All social security payments must be taken into
account when assessing how much to pay the claimant.
(5) Portugal: All amounts paid by social security are deducted
from the amount paid to the claimant.
Seeid. at 18.
207 For example, the Netherlands has such a structure currently in place. See id.
208 Bertucci states that currently in a system that does not require advance payments,
"carriers and insurers may refrain from settling any claim" because they wait until the state
social security pays. Id.
209 The social security system is entitled to reimbursement from the carrier in cases of
willful and wanton misconduct. See id. However, it is hard to prove willful and wanton
misconduct of an airline. See supra text accompanying notes 15-22.
210 The non-refundable sum could potentially allow airlines (as well as the American court
system) to justify delays in settlement actions by claiming that the families of the victims have
already been paid an amount sufficient to sustain daily living, thus removing some of the
urgency from the dispute resolution process.
211 Clearly, some within the EC believe that its concerns are better addressed by a separate
agreement. See supra text accompanying note 176.
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The final European concern is the threat posed by a strict liability regime:2 12
In the United States, it is quite common for passengers and
next of kin to pursue their claims against the carrier and
the manufacturer simultaneously to achieve full compen-
sation. On the other hand, in Europe the airline usually is
the consumers' target . . . If carriers had to facilitate
settlements under a strict liability regime, their rights to
subrogate against other possible liable or responsible
parties would have to be preserved. This issue may well
lead to serious problems.
The "serious problem" is the United States' contractual waiver laws.2t4 Unlike
the EC, which has a law stating that the producer of an airplane cannot
contractually limit or exclide itself from potential liability, the United States
has no such law. 215 Thus, if a strict liability system is adopted and a European
air carrier is the only party sued by the passenger, that carrier will be forced
to fully compensate the victim and then seek contribution from the producer
of the airline.216 There is no problem if the suit is brought in Europe or if the
producer of the airplane is European because contribution will be allowed.
2t7
Unfortunately, a great majority of the aircraft flying today are produced in
America.218 If the European carrier wanted to seek contribution, then it would
have to sue the American producer, most likely in the United States. 2 9 The
United States, however, allows producers to limit or exclude themselves from
liability, thereby causing the European carrier to get stuck with the bill for all
liability incurred in the accident. While this is not of great concern for the
United States (because both the carrier and the manufacturer are usually sued
at the same time), this poses economic disaster for European airlines that are
often the only defendant sued.
One might attempt to counter this European concern by recalling that the
IATA Amendments (via the implementation agreements) seek to limit strict







219 See id. at 18.
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liability at $150,000.220 Also recall, however, that there are serious questions
as to whether this strict liability cap is really a cap at all. The article 20
limitations seem to create a nearly impossible standard of proof for the
airline.12' Thus, the IATA Amendments' position on strict liability could
knock many smaller-market European airlines out of business.222 The EC
cannot, and will not, allow this to happen.
C. Japan
Several years ago, a much greater portion of this Note would have been
dedicated to discussing the "Japanese Initiative," which was a voluntary
movement in 1992 by ten Japanese airlines to waive all liability limits for
international air disasters.223 For the first time in the history of the Warsaw
Doctrine, article 22 of the agreement was invoked. Article 22 gives airlines
the freedom to opt out of the liability limits imposed by the Warsaw Conven-
tion if they choose to privately offer higher liability limits.224 A great majority
of literature has been dedicated to the effects of the Japanese Initiative on the
Warsaw Convention Doctrine, but many of these questions have now been
resolved due to the recent IATA Amendments, the United States DOT's
proposal, and the EC proposal.22 5 This Note will therefore not discuss the
effects that the Japanese Initiative had on the entire airline industry as they are
readily apparent.
1. Why the Japanese Initiative Came About
The Japanese wanted to alter the existing liability limits imposed by the
Warsaw Convention. They were equally dissatisfied, if not more so, than the
United States and Europe in feeling that injured passengers in international air
travel were being greatly undercompensated for injury. 26 The Japanese,
however, acted radically in 1992, over three years before any other nation took
action, to remedy the major fault of the Warsaw Doctrine.
220 See supra text accompanying note 77.
22 See Kreindler, supra note 13.
222 See Brashear, supra note 46, at 21.
22 See Baden, supra note 24, at 453.
224 See id. at 454.
225 See generally id. at 456-59 (summarizing the effect of the Japanese initiative).
226 See id. at 454.
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Two reasons underlie the Japanese decision to act. First, the Japanese had
recently endured a devastating domestic air disaster. 227 The disaster prompted
discussion concerning the great inequity of compensation that existed between
disasters occurring domestically and those on international flights. 2 ' The
Japanese could neither explain nor justify why citizen A's life was worth $1.5
million on a flight from Tokyo to Osaka, but on a flight from Tokyo to New
York, citizen A was only worth $75,000.229 The very thought that families of
the victims of the 1985 crash could only receive $75,000 per victim from the
airline carrier scared the Japanese into acting.230
The second and more prominent reason the Japanese acted three years prior
to any other nation is best described by Naneen Baden:
In Japan, the tradition is to deal with conflicts through
social arrangements. Civil disputes are taken to court only
as a last resort. The Japanese prefer a less adversarial
process than litigation, valuing "harmony and compro-
mise" to reach agreements that collectively benefit
Japanese society. Because of the availability of mediation,
and the far-reaching interdependent relationships charac-
teristic of Japanese society, fewer benefits are achieved by
litigation.... Taking someone to court in Japan consti-
tutes a "breach of the community harmony" as a lawsuit
evidences a "miscarriage of the social process." . . .
Settlements [for the 1985 crash] averaged $800,000 U.S.
per passenger. This settlement figure established a legal
precedent for compensation under Japanese law. After
this precedent was set, it would have been dishonorable
for Japanese airlines to continue operating under the
liability limits set by the Warsaw Convention.231
Therefore, between the 1985 crash and the community standards underlying
the Japanese legal process, it is clear why the Japanese acted as they did in
1992.
227 In 1985, a Japan Air Lines Boeing 747 crashed, killing 529 passengers. See id. at 453.
228 See id.
229 See Panel Discussion, The Japanese Initiative. Absolute Unlimited Liability in
International Air Travel, 60 J. AIRL. & CoM. 819, 851 (1995).
230 See id.
231 Baden, supra note 24, at 453-54 (footnotes omitted).
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2. The Japanese Initiative.- Good for Japan Alone?
In a speech before the New York County Law Association in 1995, George
Tompkins had this to say about the Japanese Initiative:
The Japanese Initiative is a great step forward but we have
to find some better way. The better way is to denounce
the Warsaw Convention. We don't need the Warsaw
Convention. We don't need it for choice of law .... We
get along without it in handling domestic cases. It serves
no purpose whatsoever . . . We should denounce [the
Warsaw Convention] .232
Tompkins, a well-respected American expert in the field, speaks harshly
about the proposal. His main concern is the very reason why the Japanese are
so thrilled with the initiative: it encourages settlement and decreases
lawsuits.233 As Tompkins accurately observes, a great amount of the litigation
surrounding an air disaster pertains to the air carrier's liability.3 Thus, if the
liability amount were collectively agreed upon (as has been the case in Japan),
there would be little need for public investigation. 235 This is a horrible
possibility according to Tompkins, because when an international air disaster
lawsuit takes place, "[w]e ha[ve] a chance to examine what went wrong, we
ha[ve] a chance to focus on fault, and we ha[ve] a chance to focus on causation
in a way that has made, and will continue to make, aviation safer. 2
36
What makes Tompkins so sure that the Japanese Initiative encourages
massive settlements? The answer lies in an unwritten, but commonly agreed
upon, code within the Japanese Initiative: each airline will compensate an
individual's family for loss of life in an amount entirely consistent with every
other airline that is part of the initiative.237 Without this presumption, how
could Tompkins be upset? Surely he does not think that removing the liability
cap in and of itself automatically transforms the world into one where all
injured parties settle and live happily ever after. Quite the opposite.
Tompkins possibly recognizes the social and political culture of the Japanese
232 Panel Discussion, supra note 229, at 831.
... See Baden, supra note 24, at 453.
234 See Panel Discussion, supra note 229, at 837.
25 See id. at 830.
236 Id.
237 See generally Baden, supra note 24, at 454 (noting the Japanese tradition of operating
in social harmony and favoring settlement over litigation).
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and realizes that, if this culture were not in place, the Japanese Initiative would
have been considerably more strict and definite in determining the exact
amount of liability per human life lost in an international air disaster.238 With
such an implication in place (all airlines will compensate equally), there is no
way that the Japanese Initiative could ever become a part of the Warsaw
Doctrine.239 Unfortunately, because the Japanese have been satisfied with the
workings of their system since its inception in 1992, there is no reason to
suspect that the Japanese will consider solving the Warsaw "problem" as
urgently as other nations throughout the world.240
CONCLUSION
The recent Swissair Flight 111 crash provides hope to the future success of
the IATA Amendments that did not exist before that deadly morning in
September 1998. If the insurance industry is able to fully compensate flight
victims while reducing premiums for all airlines in 1999, perhaps more nations
will be inclined to implement the IPA as amended by the United States DOT.
As long as the DOT, the EC, and the Japanese continue to express doubt about
the remains of the 1929 Warsaw Agreement, the survival of this seventy year
old doctrine is questionable. The implementation agreements (IPA/MIA)24" '
remain highly contested, and the United States' participation in such
agreements is tentative at best. Thus, the international air passenger cannot be
certain when he purchases an international airline ticket six months from now
whether his family will face a $75,000 liability limit or no limit at all, or
whether they may bring suit in his domiciled nation or have to bring suit
thousands of miles from home. This is the uncertainty that the Warsaw
Agreement was trying to avoid.
Due to the diversity of political interests, states may not be able to
permanently unite under one agreement. International air travel is more
complex than it was in 1929, as proved by the discontent among all IATA
nations.242 Accepting this premise, what is the alternative to the Warsaw/IATA
238 See id.
239 Under current United States anti-trust laws, agreements to limit liability amounts under
private carriers would be illegal.
240 See generally Panel Discussion, supra note 229, at 825 (noting that Japan has
seemingly solved the liability limitation problem, the area with which all other countries are
most dissatisfied).
24 See supra notes 49 and 53.
242 See Lyall, supra note 15, at 67.
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system? What if, notwithstanding the successful resolution of the Swissair
Flight 11 1 disaster, the IATA Amendments fail due to lack of implementation?
The IATA must consider allowing each country to continue on its current
path. As George Tompkins noted, each country seems to be handling its own
domestic cases just fine.243 If inequality of liability is a concern, much of it
will be alleviated by the DOT, EC, and Japanese regulations pertaining to all
international flights entering, leaving, or associated with those countries.
Indeed, the United States, Europe, and Japan account for a great number of
international air travel in the world today. Further, when nations realize they
have the liberty to pursue a liability system that can reflect their own political
cultures, more nations will be likely tojump on the bandwagon. Finally, as for
the countries (and airlines individually, because they are always free to opt out
via article 20) who refuse to implement international air disaster agreements,
market forces should push these countries and airlines out of the international
air travel industry. In the end, this individualized approach will benefit the
international community as a whole, and more importantly, will end nearly
forty years of debate over the Warsaw Doctrine.
243 See supra text accompanying note 232.
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